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Abstract
We introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching
problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and characterize suﬃciency
conditions for the existence of the stable set and the core.
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1 Introduction
The standard assumption in matching models pioneered by Gale and Shapley
(1962) is that agents belonging to one side of the market have preferences
over the agents on the opposite side. However, in many social settings people
care about not only whom they are matched with but also the partners of
the others. In such cases, individuals’ preferences depend on the realized
matching in the society, hence are interdependent.
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-
to-one matching problem, and study the existence of stable matchings. The
issue of interdependent preferences has received due attention from several
works in matching theory. Echenique and Yenmez (2007) study the college
problem where students have preferences over other students who would at-
tend the same college. Dutta and Masso (1997) and Alcalde and Revilla
(2004), among others, study preferences over colleagues. Klaus and Klijn
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1(2005) consider the problem of matching under externalities in a job market
with couples. The same problem is studied for marriage markets by Sasaki
and Toda (1996), Roy Chowdhury (2004), and Hafalir (2008f), and for a
housing market by Mumcu and Saglam (2007).
Deﬁnitely, the paper which is closest to ours is by Sasaki and Toda (1996),
who study the same formulation of interdependent preferences in one-to-one
matching problems. However, our model diﬀers from theirs as we allow the
prospect of being single in matchings while their stability notion includes
ours as a special case. Sasaki and Toda (1996) use the idea of conjectural
equilibrium to deﬁne stability requiring that a deviating pair prefers each
of the conjectured matchings that are likely to occur to the current one,
whereas in our case a deviating pair only makes comparison between the
old matching and the unique deviation matching in which the deviating pair
becomes matched while their previous mates, if any, are divorced and all
other pairs are preserved. They show that the general existence of the stable
set can be guaranteed if and only if the collection of conjectured matchings
coincides with the set of all conceivable matchings for any agent considering
deviation.1
Because of a stronger notion of stability that we use and a richer set
of possible matchings (allowing for the possibility of staying single) that
we consider, our model, unlike that of Sasaki and Toda (1996), does not
exhibit the general existence of equilibrium matchings. Nevertheless, we give
suﬃciency results for the existence of a nonempty stable set and a nonempty
core, restricting the preference proﬁles.
2 The Model
There are two nonempty, ﬁnite and disjoint sets of agents: a set of men, M
and a set of women, W. The society is denoted by N = M ∪W. There exist
at least three agents in the society; i.e., |M||W| ≥ 2. We denote a generic
man by m, a generic women by w, and a generic agent in the society by i.
A matching is a one-to-one function, µ, from N to itself, such that for
each m ∈ M and for each w ∈ W we have µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m,
1An important self-criticism made by Sasaki and Toda (1996) for their own approach
is that the conjectural valuations (expectations) are exogenously given. Hafalir (2008f)
perfects Sasaki and Toda’s model by endogenizing the set of matchings that a deviating
pair considers possible on the preferences of the other agents in the society.
2µ(m) / ∈ W implies µ(m) = m, and similarly µ(w) / ∈ M implies µ(w) = w.
If µ(m) = w, then m and w are matched to one another. If µ(i) = i,
then i remains single. We denote by µm,w a matching obtained from µ by
marrying m and w after divorcing them from their mates, if any, under µ; i.e.,
µm,w(m) = w, µm,w(µ(m)) = µ(m) if µ(m) / ∈ {m,w}, µm,w(µ(w)) = µ(w)
if µ(w) / ∈ {w,m}, and µm,w(i) = µ(i) for all i / ∈ {m,w,µ(m),µ(w)}. We
denote by MN the set of all possible matchings in society N.
Each agent has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over
the matchings in MN. Preferences of man m and woman w are represented
by Pm and P w, respectively. The proﬁle of all agents’ preferences is denoted
by P = (Pi)i∈N. A marriage market is a triple (M,W,P). For any prefer-
ence proﬁle P, we denote by Pi[k] the kth-ranked matching from top in the
preference ordering Pi of agent i. We write µ >m µ￿ to mean m prefers µ to
µ￿, and µ ≥m µ￿ to mean m likes µ at least as well as µ￿. Similarly, we write
µ >w µ￿ and µ ≥w µ￿.
A matching µ is acceptable to agent i if µ ≥i µi,i. We say that an agent in-
dividually blocks matching µ if µ is not acceptable to him or her. A matching
is individually rational if it is acceptable to each agent. For a given matching
µ, (m,w) is a blocking pair if they are not matched to one another and both
prefer the matching µm,w, at which they are a couple, to µ; i.e., µ(m) ￿= w,
µm,w >m µ and µm,w >w µ. A matching is stable if it is individually rational
and if there are no blocking pairs. We denote the set of stable matchings
(henceforth the stable set with an abuse of terminology) for the marriage
market (M,W,P) by S(M,W,P).
A matching µ￿ dominates another matching µ via a (blocking) coalition
M￿ ∪W ￿ of men and women such that µ￿(M￿ ∪W ￿) = M￿ ∪W ￿, µ￿(µ(m￿)) =
µ(m￿) for any m￿ ∈ M￿ if µ(m￿) / ∈ W ￿ ∪ {m￿}, µ￿(µ(w￿)) = µ(w￿) for any
w￿ ∈ W ￿ if µ(w￿) / ∈ M￿∪{w￿}, µ￿(i) = µ(i) for any i / ∈ M￿∪W￿∪µ(M￿∪W￿),
and µ￿ >i µ for all i ∈ M￿∪W￿. We assume in this deﬁnition that the members
of the blocking coalition seek marriage within the coalition. Moreover, the
previous mate, if exists, of any agent in the blocking coalition becomes single
under the new matching if he or she is not inside the blocking coalition, while
the mates and marital status of all other agents are unchanged. The core,
C(M,W,P), is the set of all matchings dominated by no other matching.
For any society N with the preference proﬁle P, we call a proper subset
V of matchings MN top-matching collection if V is nonempty, and for all
i ∈ N we have Pi[k] ∈ V for all k ∈ {1,2,...,|V|}. Given a society N and
an agent i ∈ N, two matchings µ,µ￿ ∈ MN are called connected by agent i
3if µ(i) = µ￿(i) and unconnected by agent i otherwise. Given a society N and
a coalition T of agents in N, a matching µ￿ is reachable by T from another
matching µ if the set of all individuals that connect µ to µ￿ is N\T. Let
R(µ,µ￿) denote the unique coalition by which µ￿ is reachable from µ.
We give two examples to clarify the basic structure and notions. When
denoting a matching µ, we list the mates of men m1,m2,m3,.... Any woman
not listed in µ is single.
Example 1. Consider a society N with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1,w2}.
The seven possible matchings are µ1 = w1,w2, µ2 = m1,w2, µ3 = w2,m2,
µ4 = m1,w1, µ5 = w2,w1, µ6 = w1,m2, µ7 = m1,m2. Consider the
following preferences for the individuals: Pm1 = µ1µ7µ5µ2µ3µ4µ6, Pm2 =
µ1µ5µ7µ2µ3µ4µ6, P w1 = µ1µ7µ5µ2µ3µ4µ6, Pw2 = µ1µ5µ7µ2µ3µ4µ6.
For this marriage market, S(M,W,P) = {µ1,µ5,µ7} and C(M,W, P) =
{µ1}. The collections {µ1}, {µ1,µ5,µ7}, {µ1,µ5,µ7,µ2}, {µ1,µ5, µ7,µ2,µ3},
and {µ1,µ5,µ7,µ2,µ3,µ4} are all top-matching collections. However, not all
of these collections are contained by the stable set or the core.
Example 2. Consider a society with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1}. The
three possible matchings are µ1 = w1m2, µ2 = m1w1, µ3 = m1m2. Let the
preferences be P m1 = µ2µ1µ3, Pm2 = µ1µ2µ3, and P w1 = µ1µ2µ3.
It is easy to check that S(M,W,P) = C(M,W,P) = {µ1,µ2}. Moreover,
{µ1,µ2} is the unique top-matching collection.
3 Results
Theorem 1. Let N be a society with the marriage market (M,W,P) sat-
isfying |M||W| ≥ 2. Suppose N has a top-matching collection V such that
whenever |V| > 1 it is true that for any µ,µ￿ ∈ V with µ ￿= µ￿, R(µ,µ￿)
contains at least one married couple or one unmarried individual under µ,
preferring µ to µ￿. Then C(M,W,P) = V.
Proof. No coalition of individuals can block any matching in V via any
other matching in MN\V, since V is a top-matching collection. Moreover,
no matching in MN\V can be in the core since it can be blocked by the
grand coalition N via any matching in V. Therefore, C(M,W,P) ⊂ V. It
4is obvious that C(M,W,P) = V if |V| = 1. Suppose |V| ≥ 2. Consider any
two matchings µ,µ￿ ∈ V. The matching µ cannot be blocked by R(µ,µ￿)
via µ￿, by the assumption that there exists in R(µ,µ￿) a married couple or a
single individual under µ, preferring µ to µ￿. Since µ and µ￿ were arbitrary,
we have V ⊂ C(M,W,P). Together with C(M,W,P) ⊂ V, this implies that
C(M,W,P) = V.
Hence, if a top-matching collection exists and is a singleton, like the set
{µ1} in Example 1, it is equal to the core of the marriage market. In the
same example, one can check that any top-matching collection that contains
{µ1,µ5,µ7} does not satisfy the suﬃciency condition of the above theorem,
since µ1 dominates any other matching for any individual. One can also verify
that the unique top-matching collection {µ1,µ2} in Example 2 satisﬁes the
hypothesis in Theorem 1, hence equals the core.
We should notice that the suﬃciency condition in Theorem 1 requires
the existence of a married couple or a single individual resisting against the
formation of a potentially capable coalition to change the current matching.
We can relax this condition to characterize preference proﬁles that yield a
nonempty stable set, inspiring from the observation that if any two matchings
in a top-matching collection are unconnected by a suﬃciently large number
of individuals (e.g. the collection {µ1,µ5,µ7} in Example 1), then no indi-
vidual or pair can block any matching in the collection. Below, we give a
suﬃciency theorem for the existence of the stable set.2
Theorem 2. Let N be a society with the marriage market (M,W,P) sat-
isfying |M||W| ≥ 2. Suppose N has a top-matching collection V such that
whenever |V| > 1 it is true that for any µ,µ￿ ∈ V with µ ￿= µ￿, at least one
of the following is met: i) |R(µ,µ￿)| ≤ 4 and R(µ,µ￿) contains at least one
married couple or one unmarried individual under µ, preferring µ to µ￿; ii)
|R(µ,µ￿)| = 4 and individuals in R(µ,µ￿) are all married or all single under
any of the two matchings; iii) |R(µ,µ￿)| > 4. Then V ⊂ S(M,W,P).
Proof. No pair or singleton can block any matching in V via any other
matching in MN\V, since V is a top-matching collection. It is obvious that
2Roy Chowdhury (2004), also dealing with the issue of existence of stable matchings
under externalities, identiﬁes suﬃciency conditions that are stronger than ours as they
require that for all agents and for all possible assignments, being single is the least preferred
outcome.
5S(M,W,P) ⊃ V if |V| = 1. Suppose |V| ≥ 2. Consider any two matchings
µ,µ￿ ∈ V that satisfy one of the three conditions in the theorem. First note
that a pair of man and woman can block µ via µ￿ only if |R(µ,µ￿)| ∈ {2,3,4}.
So, if condition (iii) holds, µ cannot be blocked via µ￿ by coalitions of size
not exceeding two. The conclusion also remains true if condition (ii) holds,
since one needs the approvals of all four individuals in R(µ,µ￿) to reach µ￿
from µ. Finally, the argument is clear if condition (i) is the case. Thus, we
have S(M,W,P) ⊃ V.
One can check that the top-matching collection V = {µ1,µ5, µ7} in Ex-
ample 1 only satisﬁes condition (ii) in Theorem 2 since for any two matchings
µ,µ￿ ∈ V with µ ￿= µ￿, we have |R(µ,µ￿)| = 4 and all agents are married under
µ1 and µ5 while all agents are single under µ7. Hence V ⊂ S(M,W,P).
When one of the genders has a unique member in the society, a top-
matching collection can only satisfy condition (i) in the above theorem, since
any two matchings can be unconnected by at most three agents. We observe
that condition (i) is met in Example 2 by the unique top-matching collection
{µ1,µ2} that has already been checked to satisfy a similar hypothesis in
Theorem 1.
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